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Weiss: ICC & Occupation

THE ICC SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE OCCUPATION
Uri Weiss*
PREFACE AND SUMMARY
The International Criminal Court (the ICC) has neither
universal jurisdiction (jurisdiction that is not dependent on the consent
of the parties), nor consent-based jurisdiction (jurisdiction that
depends on the mutual consent of the two involved states). The ICC
does have jurisdiction in cases in which the conduct to be judged took
place in a State that accepts the Rome Statute (that declares that the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any
statute of limitations).
Universal jurisdiction would provide the best protection of
human rights. Universal jurisdiction does not obtain. It obtains only
partially. That is to say, the ICC, which is the institution that is closest
to having universal jurisdiction, has only partial universal jurisdiction.
The assumption is common that partial jurisdiction is second best.
This is not always true. The shift of the ICC from traditional consentbased jurisdiction to a partially universal jurisdiction might weaken
human rights protection in some scenarios. The ICC may provide the
following undesirable incentives: it might encourage an occupying
state to continue the occupation in order to prevent the emerging free
state from becoming a party to the Rome Statute and, especially, from
accepting its jurisdiction retroactively. It may likewise encourage the
occupying state to initiate a civil war in the occupied state as a means
of discouraging it from joining the ICC. Moreover, it may encourage
*
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the rise of terrorist leadership in the occupying state to discourage the
occupied people from striving toward independence and joining the
ICC. How should the ICC prevent these undesirable incentives? The
simplest manner is, of course, the institution of the right of the
occupied people to join the ICC even before the termination of the
occupation. The occupying state must not have veto power with regard
to the occupied people’s capacity to join the ICC. The current inability
of Palestine to join the ICC as long as it is occupied comprises an
incentive for Israel to continue the occupation.
1.

PEACE, WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INCENTIVES

Robert J. Aumann proposed in his 2005 Nobel Prize Lecture
that efforts to bring about world peace should change direction. 1 The
aim of these efforts was to resolve specific military conflicts between
neighboring nations. Aumann’s suggestion was “that we should shift
emphasis and study war in general” by using game theory. 2 Aumann
said that he talks about “the incentives that lead to war, and about
building incentives that prevent war.”3 Let us follow this proposal and
see where it leads.
Game theory proposes the optimal management of conflict
and/or cooperation in some specific situations. It describes them
within the framework of one simple scheme or formula on the
supposition that it is not a real constraint. For, rather than a study of a
particular situation, game theory purports to present the common
general principle, put in a rather simple scheme, that allegedly guides
many interactions, including war and peace, trade, litigation, and
courtship.
Game theory discusses questions, such that what is recommended for
a player to do in a given interaction given their preferences. Some
game theorists propose predictions about the result of a particular
game. The problem is that it is hard to know what game is played, as
pointed out by Mario Bunge.4 Thus, we should also ask what game is
played when we make real life predictions. Some game theoreticians,
particularly those of the mechanism design theory, propose what game
1

Robert J. Aumann, War and Peace, Les Prix Nobel 2005, edited by K. Grandin,
The Nobel Foundation, Stockholm, 350 (2006).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See generally MARIO BUNGE, SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER DEBATE (1998).
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to create, and the approach that Uri Weiss and Joseph Agassi develop
is that the most important contribution of game theory is by
recommending what games should be prevented.
In Game Theory, we analyze behavior of rational players.
According to Aumann:
[i]t is a big mistake to say that war is irrational. We take
all the ills of the world – wars, strikes, racial
discrimination – and dismiss them by calling them
irrational. . . . [O]nce we understand that [they are
rational], . . . we can at least somehow address the
problem.5
It is important to distinguish between an economically rational player
and a philosophically rational player. In Game Theory or in law and
economics, when we speak about rational players, we do not speak
about players who have critical thought, who challenge their beliefs
or try to find proof and refutation, but about players who choose the
efficient means to promote their own goals—bad or good. Thus, one
may be an absolute pacifist and still think that war is rational—
rational in the economic sense. War-loving people are not rational in
the philosophical sense, but they are rational in the economic sense
when they promote wars. Thus, for example, it is much better to
promote peace economics than war economics and to make war
industries less profitable.
One may say: but this is a methodology of cost-benefit
analysis, so how can it be implemented to international law?
Particularly, how can this methodology promote values such as peace
and human rights? The answer is that game theory can teach us how
to design incentives, such that states prefer peace to war and prefer
avoiding war crimes, and which incentives the law must not provide.
In order to make war inferior to peace, the mechanism should be such
that it will not be worthwhile to prefer aggressive behavior to
peaceful behavior or war crimes to legal conduct. Game theory can
also help us to investigate how to lead to peaceful and friendly
feelings.
In another piece, Aumann argues that The Prisoner’s Dilemma 6
demonstrates that it is not enough for something to be to our mutual
5

Aumann, supra note 1, at 351.
Prisoners’ dilemma: suppose two people are arrested for possession illegal weapons
near a bank in which an armed robbery just took place. The police have strong
6
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advantage for us to achieve cooperation. 7 Even when cooperation is
to your advantage and to my advantage, the incentives can still lead us
to non-cooperation—to a result that is disastrous for both of us. It is
not enough to say: “Let’s cooperate, let’s not go to war, let’s not fight.”
We have to pay attention to incentives when we are analyzing a
situation. It is not enough to say, “let’s make love, not war.” The
incentive has to be there. 8 Aumann argues that a statement in this
direction was made also by Barack Obama in his Nobel Prize Lecture:
“The belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it.”9
Let us refer: it is true that this belief is not enough to achieve peace,
but the belief that peace is desirable is a sine qua non to prevent wars,
and trust sometimes makes the difference between war and peace.
International institutions should be designed by peace lovers such that
they will prevent wars and war crimes, and if they can create peaceful
feeling, then it will be a great advantage for them. The biggest
achievement of the European Union is that if one EU state can occupy
another EU state and win the war for sure, and even without paying
with the blood of their soldiers, then their citizens will resist it. This
is a big advantage of the EU model on the Pax Romana model.10 When
nations maintain peaceful feelings, then the cost of mistakes becomes
enough evidence to charge them with the minor infringement that incurs a lenient
penalty but not enough evidence to charge them with the severe infringement that
incurs a severe penalty. To achieve that, the police isolate them and propose to each
of them a plea bargain. The options that the game offers are these: if they both betray
each other, they will both receive a medium penalty; if they cooperate with each other
and keep silent, then they will both receive the lenient penalty. If only one defects,
then that one will walk, and the other will receive the severe penalty. The outcomes
then are A (freedom), B (lenient penalty), C (medium penalty), and D (severe
penalty):

Cooperate
Defect

Cooperate
B, B
A, D

Defect
D, A
C, C

7

Robert J. Aumann, Game Engineering, HEBREW U. JERUSALEM, CTR FOR STUD.
RATIONALITY 11 (2009).
8
See id.
9
Barack H. Obama, A Just and Lasting Peace, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html
(last visited May 3, 2021).
10
See generally Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, The Game Theory of the European
Union Versus the Pax Romana, DEPAUL L. R EV. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3621621.
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much lower. Sometimes, even though the incentive not to enter war is
there, the decision maker will dismiss it. However, if the decision
maker thinks that peace is desirable, it will make all the difference
between war and peace. Since mistakes are inevitable, it is not enough
that the incentive will be there.
We are interested in preventing wars, occupations, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity; therefore, we will analyze the incentives
provided by the ICC from a general point of view, and we will analyze
the behavior of the occupying state and the occupied people as
economically rational players, i.e., players who respond to incentives
in a way that promotes their own goals. When we analyze the
incentives of the ICC, we conclude that unfortunately, the ICC in its
current legal structure, may encourage in some conditions occupation,
war crimes, and civil wars; and hence, we need to amend or interpret
the law regarding the right to join the Rome Statute, such that the
occupier cannot prevent the occupied from joining the Statute.
This paper may present an example to Aumann’s proposition:
“the incentive of the players interact in complex ways, and lead to
surprisingly, often counter-intuitive results.”11 Furthermore, this paper
implements the approach that Uri Weiss developed with Joseph
Agassi:
[W]e suggest that the most significant achievement of
game theory is not in the design or in the applications
of games but in the suggestions of what games it is
unwise to play. Here we follow Popper, who said,
politically, preventing pain or suffering has priority
over creating pleasure. 12 Obviously, in game theory,
prevention is also much easier than application, because
every game requires some conditions for its very
applicability, and these are never too clear and seldom
parts of game theory proper.13
We will present a potentially dangerous game that the Rome Statute
may create, and we will search for mechanisms to prevent this
dangerous game. In other words, we will investigate which games of
11

Aumann, supra note 1, at 351.
KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 442 (1945).
13
Uri Weiss & Joseph Agassi, How Game Theory Encourages Peace (forthcoming);
see The Game Theory of the European Union Versus the Pax Romana, supra note
10.
12
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partial universal jurisdiction should be prevented. In order to prevent
bad games, it is particularly recommended to reject the claim that an
occupied people cannot join the ICC. Otherwise, the occupier will
have an incentive to preserve the occupation. In the word of the
Talmud: “so that the sinner does not profit [from his sin]:”14 the law
should not comprise incentive to sin.15
2.

THE ICC JURISDICTION
2.1.

The Historical Background of the ICC

The Rome Statute is due to a political compromise. 16 On the
question of jurisdiction, the British proposal and the German proposal
differed. A proposal by South Korea was a compromise between them,
and it was the most popular at that time.17 The British proposal was
this: in the case of non-state parties, jurisdiction of the court should
hold if, and only if, both the custodial state and the territorial state
agree to it.18 By contrast, the German proposal was this: the court
should have universal jurisdiction and no agreement of either side was
required.19 The German proposal rested on the idea that regarding core
crimes, international law already commands universal jurisdiction; the
14
15

Mishnah Challah 2:7.
The ICC prosecutor wrote:
Significantly, there appear to be several reasons why a case-specific
application of the Montevideo criteria to Palestine is warranted. First, the
internationally recognised right to self-determination of the Palestinian
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Second, the detrimental
impact of the ongoing breaches of international law on Palestine’s
effective authority over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and on the
realisation of the right of self-determination of its people. Finally, the
bilateral recognition of Palestine afforded by at least 138 States.

International Criminal Court, Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a
Ruling on the Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine, No. ICC-01/18 (Jan. 22,
2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00161.PDF.
Our game theoretical analysis strengths her second argument.
16
See Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at the Rome
Conference, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ch. 2.3 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D Jones eds.,
2002).
17
See Proposal of the Republic of South Korea, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.6 (June
18, 1998).
18
See Kirsch & Robinson, supra note 16.
19
Id.
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international court should possess the same authority as the national
courts. The Korean proposal was:
that by becoming a Party a State would be considered
to have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. The
jurisdictional nexus was that anyone or more of four
involved States Parties have consented to the Court
exercising jurisdiction over a case: either the territorial
State, State of nationality of the accused, State of
nationality of the victim, or custodial State. 20
a.

The ICC Jurisdiction Under the Rome Statute

The Rome Statute reflects a political compromise between the
above competing proposals. The ICC jurisdiction is determined by
Article 12 of the Rome Statute:
Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the
crimes referred to in article 5.
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance
with paragraph 3:
The State on the territory of which the conduct in
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on
board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that
vessel or aircraft;
The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.
If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this
Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may,
by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the
crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate

20

Sharon A. Williams, The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court—
Universal Jurisdiction or State Consent—To Make or Break the Package Deal, 75
INT. L. STUD. 541, 546 (2000).
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with the Court without any delay or exception in
accordance with Part 9. 21
According to Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC depends on the
consent of the states. If a state accepts the jurisdiction of the court, the
court will have jurisdiction over it. On the other hand, when a state
accepts its jurisdiction, then the ICC has jurisdiction to judge war
crimes that have been committed on its territory, even by foreign
forces.22 This means that if an invaded state accepts the jurisdiction of
the ICC, then the soldiers of the invading state can be investigated and
prosecuted although the latter has never accepted the jurisdiction.
Furthermore, according to Article 11, paragraph 2 23 and Article
12, paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute, a state can accept the ICC’s
jurisdiction with respect to crimes that had been committed since the
entry into force of the Rome Statute, which was on July 1, 2002.24 This
is even if those crimes had been committed before that state joined.
This means that if a country were to join the ICC on January 1, 2022,
it could accept the authority of the court even over crimes committed
between January 7, 2002 and January 1, 2022, and also, of course, the
authority of ICC jurisdiction over future crimes.
To conclude: first, when a state accepts the jurisdiction of the
court, the jurisdiction is also valid for crimes committed on its
territory, even by foreign forces. Second, it can accept the ICC’s
jurisdiction even over crimes that were committed before it joined but
since July 2002. Those two propositions lead to the conclusion that a
state may accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes that were
committed on its territory by foreign forces before that state became
party to the Rome Statute.
It should be noted that the rule is that “[t]he ICC may only
exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so,
including where they purport to act but in reality are unwilling or

21

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
22
Id.
23
Rome Statute art. 11 (“If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into
force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a
declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.”).
24
Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, July, 17 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
38544.
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unable to genuinely carry out proceedings.” 25 Furthermore, “the Court
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: . . . [t]he case is not
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” 26 For
example, the General prosecutor rejected the request to investigate
Israel regarding Mavi Marmara because she found that the crimes did
not meet the demand of gravity.27
2.2.

A Particular Question on the Table of the Court

In January 2009, the Palestinian Authority’s justice minister
lodged a declaration with the ICC unilaterally recognizing its
jurisdiction for “acts committed on the territory of Palestine since . . .
July [1,] 2002.”28 However, the prosecutor of the ICC has rejected the
request. The Office of the Prosecutor announced that it could not act
on the Palestinian declaration because Article 12 of the Rome Statute
established that only: “a ‘[s]tate’ [could] confer jurisdiction on the
[c]ourt” and “deposit an instrument of accession with the Secretary‐
General of the United Nations. In instances where it is controversial
or unclear whether an applicant constitutes a ‘[s]tate’, it is the practice
of the Secretary-General to follow or seek the General Assembly’s
directives on the matter.”29
Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the president of the Palestinian National Authority,
wrote on May 17, 2011, in the New York Times:
Palestine’s admission to the United Nations would pave
the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a
legal matter, not only a political one. It would also pave
25

International Criminal Court, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of
Complementarity
in
Practice
3
(2003),
https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/20BB4494-70F9-4698-8E30907F631453ED/281984/complementarity.pdf.
26
Id. (quoting Rome Statute art. 17(1)(d)).
27
International Criminal Court, Victims’ Response to the “Application for Judicial
Review by the Government of the Comoros” of 2 March 2020, No. ICC-01/13-107
(May 4, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_01778.PDF.
28
Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Justice, Declaration Recognizing the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-4481-95D4C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf.
29
International Criminal Court, Situation in Palestine, https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf.
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the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at the
United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the
International Court of Justice.30
On November 29, 2012, the General Assembly “grant[ed]
Palestine non-member observer State status at the [UN].”31 Moreover,
“on January 1, 2015, the Government of Palestine lodged a declaration
under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) over alleged crimes committed
‘in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June
13, 2014.’”32 “On January 2, 2015, the Government of Palestine
acceded to the Rome Statute by depositing its instrument of accession
with the UN Secretary-General. The Rome Statute entered into force
on April 1, 2015.”33 “On May 22, 2018, pursuant to Articles 13 (a)
and 14 of the Rome Statute, the Government of Palestine (“Palestine”),
a State Party to the Rome Statute, referred to the Prosecutor the
situation in Palestine since . . . June [13,] 2014, with no end date.” “On
. . . December [20,] 2019, the ICC’s Chamber also received the
Prosecution request for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction
in Palestine. (the ‘Prosecutor’s 20 December 2019 Request’).”34
On January 21, 2020, the Chamber issued the ‘Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for an extension of the page limit,’ thereby:
(i) granting the Request for an Extension of the Page Limit; (ii)
rejecting in limine the Prosecutor’s December 20, 2019 Request; (iii)
inviting the Prosecutor to file a new request of no more than 110 pages,
including any references to the Supplementary Information; and (iv)
instructing the Registrar to strike from the record of the Situation and

30

Mahmoud Abbas, The Long Overdue Palestinian State, N.Y. TIMES (May 17,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html.
31
General Assembly Grants Palestine Non-member Observer State Status at UN, UN
NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012), https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/11/427052-generalassembly-grants-palestine-non-member-observer-state-status-un.
32
Md. Zakir Hossain, Implication of ICC’s Decision to Investigate War Crime in
Palestine, DAILY SUN (Feb. 13, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://www.dailysun.com/printversion/details/535515/Implication-of-ICC%E2%80%99s-Decisionto-Investigate-War-Crime-in-Palestine.
33
International Criminal Court, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
(2016), (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-202100/.
34
Id.
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withdraw from the Court’s website the Prosecutor’s December 20,
2019 Request, its annex, and the Supplementary Information. 35
On January 22, 2020, “the Chamber received the ‘Prosecution
request pursuant to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction in Palestine”36 (the ‘Prosecutor’s Request’).
The Prosecutor wrote:
The Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a reasonable
basis to initiate an investigation into the situation in
Palestine, pursuant to article 53(1) of the Statute. There
is a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes have
been or are being committed in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip (“Gaza”
or “Gaza Strip”), and the Prosecution has identified
potential cases arising from the situation which would
be admissible. There are no substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice
...
notwithstanding her own view that the Court does
indeed have the necessary jurisdiction in this situation,
the Prosecutor is mindful of the unique history and
circumstances of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Indeed, it is no understatement to say that determination
of the Court’s jurisdiction may, in this respect, touch on
complex legal and factual issues. Palestine does not
have full control over the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and its borders are disputed. The West Bank
and Gaza are occupied and East Jerusalem has been
annexed by Israel. The Palestinian Authority does not
govern Gaza. Moreover, the question of Palestine’s
Statehood under international law does not appear to
have been definitively resolved. Although the
International Criminal Court, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for an
extension of the page limit, No. ICC-01/18-11 (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00144.PDF.
36
Portia Karegeya, 8 February 2021 – Decision on Territorial Jurisdiction in
Palestine Situation, ICL MEDIA REV. (Feb. 8, 2021 at 8:43 PM),
http://www.iclmediareview.com/8-february-2021-decision-on-territorialjurisdiction-in-palestine-situation.
35

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 11

808

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

Prosecutor is of the view that the Court may exercise its
jurisdiction notwithstanding these matters, she is aware
of the contrary views. Consequently, in order to seek
judicial resolution of this matter at the earliest
opportunity—and thus to facilitate the practical
conduct of her investigation by placing it on the
soundest legal foundation—the Prosecutor exercises
her power under article 19(3) of the Statute and
respectfully requests Pre-Trial Chamber I (“the
Chamber”) to rule on the scope of the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction in the situation in Palestine. Specifically,
the Prosecution seeks confirmation that the “territory”
over which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under
article 12(2)(a) comprises the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, that is the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem, and Gaza. 37
The prosecutor also wrote:
In concluding that the Court has the necessary
jurisdiction for this situation—and the territorial scope
of this jurisdiction—the Prosecutor has primarily been
guided by Palestine’s status as a State Party to the Rome
Statute since . . . January [2,] 2015 following the deposit
of its instruments of accession with the United Nations
(“UN” or “United Nations”)
Secretary-General
pursuant to article 125(3).” And she raised the
alternative possibility that “the Chamber could likewise
conclude—for the strict purposes of the Statute only—
that Palestine is a State under relevant principles and
rules of international law.38
On January 28, 2020, the ICC’s Chamber invited Israel,
Palestine “and victims in the Situation in the State of Palestine, to
submit written observations on the Prosecutor’s Request no later than

37

International Criminal Court, Prosecution Request Pursuant to Article 19(3) for a
Ruling on the Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine, No. ICC-01/18-12 (Jan.
22, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00161.PDF.
38
Id.
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. . . March [16,] 2020.”39 The Chamber also appointed counsel from
the OPCV to represent victims in the Situation in the State of Palestine
who do not have legal representation for the sole purpose of submitting
observations in accordance with paragraph 13 of the present order.40
The chamber also invited other “States, organizations and/or persons
wishing to provide written observations on the Prosecutor’s Request to
submit applications for leave to file such observations by no later than
. . . February [14,] 2020.”41
On February 5, 2021, the ICC’s Chamber:
FINDS that Palestine is a State Party to the Statute;
FINDS, by majority, Judge Kovács dissenting, that, as
a consequence, Palestine qualifies as ‘[t]he State on the
territory of which the conduct in question occurred’ for
the purposes of article 12(2)(a) of the Statute; and
FINDS, by majority, Judge Kovács dissenting, that the
Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in
Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel
since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem.42
It should be noted that one of the majority judges, Judge Marc Perrin
de Brichambaut, “conclude[ed] that a determination on a question of
jurisdiction pursuant to article 19(3) of the Statute may be made in
the specific circumstances of the present proceedings.”43
39

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Invites Palestine, Israel, Interested States and Others to
Submit
Observations,
ICC-CPI
(Jan.
28,
202),
https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1512.
40
International Criminal Court, Order Setting the Procedure and the Schedule for
the Submission of Observations, No. ICC-01/18-14 (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00217.PDF.
41
International Criminal Court, Request for Leave to File Written Observations
Regarding the “Situation in the State of Palestine,” No. ICC-01/18-28 (Feb. 14,
2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00463.PDF.
42
International Criminal Court, Decision on the ‘Prosecution Request Pursuant to
Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine’, No.
ICC-01/18-143
(Feb.
5,
2021),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01165.PDF.
43
International Criminal Court, Pratially Separate Opinion of Judge Perrin de
Brichambaut, No. ICC-01/18-143-Anx2 (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.icccpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2021_01166.PDF.
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NEW PROBLEMS WITH THE ICC’S JURISDICTION
3.1.

Incentives for Continuing the Occupation

One of the new problems with the ICC’s jurisdiction is that in
some circumstances, it might provide incentives for the occupying
state to continue the occupation. This is the case when the occupied
people can join the ICC regime after, and only after, the end of the
occupation. This may be because the occupied people will not be
recognized as having a state, as Israel claims regarding the
Palestinians, and it may be because the occupying state may appoint a
“puppet leadership” for the occupied people, and it may be because
during the period of the occupation, the occupier has the power to
extort the occupied people.
The capacity to neutralize the ICC by appointing a “puppet
government,” or the capacity to extort the occupied state, may also, in
particular circumstances, incentivize a state to occupy in order to
appoint such a government. First, we will show that the right to join
retroactively might encourage the continuation of the occupation; next,
we will show that, similarly, even the right to join prospectively might
encourage continuation of the occupation. Thus, we strongly
recommend preventing those games, first of all by recognizing the
right of occupied people to join the ICC.
a.

The Effect of the Right to Join Retroactively

Even if the occupying state was not a party to the statute in
2010, it can adopt it retroactively in 2022, and then the ICC might have
jurisdiction even over crimes that were committed by the occupier
during 2010. Thus, on the one hand, the right to join retroactively
deters the occupier from violating the Rome Statute, even when the
occupied state is not a party to it; this effect of the ability to join
retroactively promotes human rights. On the other hand, the occupied
people can sometimes join the ICC only after the occupation is ended,
and this provides the occupying state with a strong incentive to
maintain the occupation. This may be because the occupied people do
not meet the condition of statehood, and it may be because the
occupied people are controlled by puppet leadership. The occupying
power might continue the occupation in order to prevent the occupied
people from establishing a free state in order to prevent them from
adopting the Rome Statute and possibly accepting ICC jurisdiction

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/11

14

Weiss: ICC & Occupation

2021

ICC & OCCUPATION

811

retroactively. This scenario might happen even if the cost/benefit
analysis on behalf of the occupying state would lead it to end the
occupation. A mechanism that is intended to protect human rights
might become a mechanism of maintaining the occupation.
Let us now show by a game tree that the Rome Statute might
prevent the occupier from ending the occupation:
1. We have two players: occupier state and occupied people.
2. This is the sequence of events: first, the occupying state should
choose between “continue the occupation” and “end the occupation.”
If it chooses “continue the occupation,” that ends the game, and the
result will be “continuation of the occupation.” If the occupying state
chooses “end the occupation,” then the occupied people need to choose
between “accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC retroactively,” and “not
accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC retroactively.” If the occupied
people choose to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC retroactively, that
ends the game, and the result will be “end of the occupation, with the
ICC having jurisdiction over previous crimes.” However, if the
occupied people choose not to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC
retroactively, then that ends the game, and the result will be “end of
the occupation with the ICC having no jurisdiction over previous
crimes.”
3. The occupier state’s order of priority is: I. end of the occupation with
the ICC having no jurisdiction over previous crimes; II. continuation
of the occupation; III. end of the occupation with the ICC having
jurisdiction over previous crimes.
4. The occupied people’s order of priority are: I. end of the occupation
with the ICC having jurisdiction over previous crimes; II. end of the
occupation with the ICC having no jurisdiction over the previous
crimes; III. continuation of the occupation.
5. Both sides know the game.
6. The occupying state and the occupied people are rational players,
and the occupying state knows that the occupied people are rational.
Let us now show the situation in the form of a game tree. In the tree,
the payoff of the result most favored by a player is 1 (his best result),
the payoff of his second-best result is 2 (his second-best result), and
that of his worst result is 3.
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The Game Tree
Continue the
occupation

continuation of the
occupation
(2,3)

Occupying
power

End the
occupation

Don’t accept
the jurisdiction Occupied
retroactively
people

end of the occupation, with the ICC
having no jurisdiction over the
previous crimes
(1,2)

Accept the
jurisdiction
retroactively

end of the occupation, with the
ICC having jurisdiction over
previous crimes
(3,1)

Figure 1. The simple Game of Occupation in the Shadow of the
ICC
The result of this Game will be a continuation of the occupation. This
is because the occupier chooses first whether to continue or to end the
occupation. If the occupying power chooses to end the occupation,
then the occupied people will have two alternatives: end the occupation
without giving jurisdiction to the ICC or end the occupation with
jurisdiction given to the ICC in which case the occupied people will
choose to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, which is the worst result
in the eyes of the occupying power. However, if the occupying power
chooses to continue the occupation, then the players will obtain a result
of occupation without jurisdiction, which is the occupier’s second-best
outcome. Thus, the occupier will choose not to end the occupation,
which leads to its second most favored outcome and to the worst from
the point of view of the occupied people. The result of this game will
be the “continuation of occupation.” Although both players prefer the
end of occupation without giving the ICC jurisdiction over the
previous crimes, the result will be a continuation of the occupation. 44
44

I thank Ariel Porat for his comment that this problem is similar to the problem of
defensive medicine.
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In technical language, this is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium
of this game. Thus, this game should be prevented. We will discuss
later how to prevent this game; particularly, the occupied people
should have a right to join the ICC even before the end of the
occupation.
If we change the game such that the occupied people have no
possibility of adopting the Rome Statute and accepting its jurisdiction
retroactively, then we will achieve an end to occupation, but without
jurisdiction, which would be better for both sides. Hence, in this
particular situation, it would be better for both sides that the occupied
party had had no option of obtaining the jurisdiction retroactively.
Actually, in the course of the implicit negotiation between the
occupying power and the occupied people, it might be better for the
occupied people to make a commitment not to accept the jurisdiction
of the ICC retroactively.45 Thus, the occupied people might benefit
from not having this right. Thus, the above game should be prevented.
One may criticize the above analysis: why does the application
of the game theory start where it starts in this analysis—that is, after
the occupation has been established? Our reply is that every new
legislation is in the middle of some games. This is also the legislation
of the Rome Statute: in the Israeli-Palestine case, for example, the new
rule enters long after the occupation has been established.46
b.

The Effect of the Right to Join Prospectively

Moreover, sometimes, the occupying state might assume that
even after its withdrawal, further rounds of war and bloodshed between
it and the previously occupied people would be expected to take place;
and therefore, the power of the new state to adopt the Rome Statute,
even prospectively, might discourage the occupier from ending the
occupation. Thus, in order to protect themselves from being exposed
45

About the advantage of being committed during negotiation, see THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 30 (1960).
46
Moreover, there are many countries that are not members, and their potentially
occupier may make it impracticable or impossible for them to join. Of course,
making the exit from occupation more expensive may also deter countries from
entering into it. However, the cost of making it very costly to end occupation is
enormous; sometimes occupation is not a result of a planned action and making the
exit from occupation too expensive may lead the occupation to remain. It is much
cheaper to deter the beginning of occupation by other means, and this is one of the
goals of the criminalization of Aggression by the Rome Statute.
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to the ICC’s jurisdiction in subsequent rounds of the conflict, they
might continue the occupation. 47 This is another counterproductive
incentive provided by the Rome Statute; if the conflict is expected to
continue, then it might be better for the occupied people to undertake
a commitment not to join the ICC, even prospectively. Or, to restate
this speculation more formally, if and only if, 1) both parties prefer an
end of the occupation with no joining the ICC to continuation of the
occupation, and the occupying state prefers ending the occupation with
no prospective jurisdiction of the ICC to continuation of the
occupation; and additionally, 2) the occupied people prefers to join the
ICC after the end of occupation rather than not to join it after the end
of occupation—under these conditions, they would both benefit from
making joining the ICC impossible for the new state formed by the
formerly occupied people. In this situation, it would be to the benefit
of both of them to relinquish the right to join the ICC.48 In this case,
the occupation will end but will be transformed to a new order in which
the former occupied state has no right to join to ICC. Thus, the above
game should be prevented. We will discuss later how to prevent this
game.
47

It is realistic to think that the problem with the retroactive jurisdiction holds for
both the American Occupation of Iraq and the Israeli Occupation of Palestine, but
the problem with the prospective jurisdiction holds for the Israeli Occupation but not
to the American one. On the other hand, it may be claimed that if there is a real
potential for continuity of the conflict, then it may be rational for the free state of the
formerly occupied people not to join retroactively in order not to make the
punishment by the ICC a “sunk cost.” This means the former occupier power may
be encouraged to attack if it is punished, whether it commits new war crimes or not.
The conclusion will be that if the effect of the right to join prospectively holds, then
the effect of the right to join retroactively does not. However, there will be the
problem that this incentivizes the former occupier state to make the continuity of the
conflict a real option in order to encourage the new state of the former occupied
people not to join retroactively.
48
The fact that the ICC has only complementary jurisdiction does not abolish the
incentive of the occupying state to continue with the occupation. This is so since
even if the occupying state is considered to be a state that has a proper legal system
that investigates properly the conduct of its prime minister, minister, commanders,
and soldiers, the possibility of an intervention by the ICC incentivizes the state’s
court to apply international criminal law, and the state may wish to block it. Shai
Dothan even claimed that the jurisdictional rule that better deters officers depends
on the probability of prosecution by the ICC that officers face. Complementarity
deters more officers when the probability of prosecution is low, as it is now. See
Shai Dothan, Deterring War Crimes, 40 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG 739, 747-53
(2015).
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The Effect of Benvenisty’s Proposal

The proposal of Professor Eyal Benvenisty has highly
objectionable results:
To date, Palestine has yet to determine its own
territorial claims. Although it has specified certain
territory in its referral to this Court, over the years and
even quite recently it has presented different territorial
positions in other fora, both internationally and
internally. Palestine’s ambivalence regarding its
sovereign territorial claims may be prudent from a
strategic political standpoint. However, such selective
argumentation pertaining to territorial scope belies
legal certainty and coherence. Selective assertions
amount to no legally valid assertion. Interests of legal
stability, certainty and coherence require that, when
entities claim statehood without having exercised
effective control over territory, they at the very least
define clearly and consistently what territory they claim
as their own.
As I have written at length elsewhere, international
tribunals fulfill a crucial role in stating what the law is.
Being in the unique position to develop and stabilize
global expectations entails a heavy responsibility for
international adjudicators. Therefore, they must take
account of the implications of their judgments beyond
the specific case at hand. Similarly, international
tribunals must seek coherence when they refer to
States’ assertions of territorial jurisdiction or when they
determine such questions with respect to disputed
claims.
Against this background, the absence of a clear and
unequivocal erga omnes Palestinian commitment to its
territorial pursuits in my view leaves the Court unable
to ascertain the “territory of” Palestine for purposes of
the Court’s jurisdiction without eroding its role as
custodian of international legal order. Embracing a
bifurcated, case-specific approach to territorial
sovereignty would be detrimental to the endeavor of

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 11

816

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

creating a coherent legal system, one that resolves
potentially contradictory outcomes. 49
Eyal Benvenisty’s proposal obviously encourages the occupier to
establish settlements. For, as he observes, the illegal Israeli
settlements in the occupied territory prevents decisions regarding the
boundaries of the future Palestine state, thereby preventing Palestine
from acquiring the right to join the ICC. Moreover, since Palestine is
ready to negotiate its boundaries and to swap territories such that part
of the settlement will be part of Israel, the proposal amounts to a
punishment of Palestine by depriving it of the right to join the ICC.
This encourages the occupier to create more settlements and to refuse
to make compromises regarding the settlements in any peace
negotiation and to increase the vagueness of the border between Israel
and Palestine.
3.2.

Incentive to Encourage Terrorist Leadership
Among Occupied People

Another problem with ICC jurisdiction is that it might provide
an incentive for the occupying state to encourage terrorist leadership
among the occupied people in order to discourage the leadership of the
occupied state from adopting the Rome Statute. In this case, even the
emerging free state might not join in order prevent the investigation
and prosecution of its former leadership. The occupying power might
encourage the occupied people to prefer an end to occupation without
jurisdiction to an end to occupation with jurisdiction.
This incentive is valid not only in the case of occupied people
who are not considered to have a state but also in the case in which it
is beyond any doubt that the occupied people have an absolute right to
join. The occupying state may be interested in a game “without ICC”
and thus may incentivize the occupied state to choose not to join the
Rome Statute by convincing leadership that joining the ICC will put
them at personal risk. This incentive is valid not only in the case of
occupation but also in cases in which one state may significantly
influence the identity of the leadership of another state.
49

International Criminal Court, Request for Leave to Submit Amicus Curiae
Observations in the Proceedings Relating to the Prosecution Request Pursuant to
Article 19(3) for a Ruling on the Court’s Territorial Jurisdiction in Palestine, No.
ICC-01/18-28
(Feb.
14,
2020),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00463.PDF.
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Incentive to Encourage a Civil War

A further potential problem that could arise from the ICC’s
jurisdiction is that the occupying state might encourage a civil war, in
which war crimes would be expected to be committed, in order to
prevent the emerging free state from joining the ICC. This is because,
in such a case, the occupied power would be motivated to prefer no
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This leads to the conclusion that since
occupied free people are potentially able to adopt the Rome Statute and
to accept its jurisdiction retroactively, the occupying power might have
an incentive to encourage the emergence of terrorist leadership among
the occupied people and to encourage a civil war in the occupied
territory. Moreover, if the Court sees civil war as cancelling the status
of the occupied as a state, then it may incentivize the occupied state to
encourage a civil war in the occupied territory.
4.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Having pointed out the problems, let us now ask, what are the
possible solutions to the ICC’s Jurisdiction Problem? In other words,
how can we prevent the games in which the occupying state is
incentivized to continue with the occupation in order to prevent the
occupied state from joining and the game in which one state
encourages the other state to make war crimes in order to discourage
the other state from joining? We will present and discuss several
possible solutions, including those that we recommend resisting, but
let us clarify that we strongly support recognizing the right of occupied
people to join the ICC even before the end of occupation, such that the
occupier will not be incentivized to continue with the occupation.
a.

Might the Security Council Solve the ICC’s
Jurisdiction Problem?

It could be claimed that the Security Council has the authority
to intervene in problematic situations and thereby to solve the ICC’s
jurisdiction problem. How could the Security Council solve this
problem? The first possibility is that, in a specific problematic case,
the Security Council would pass a resolution giving jurisdiction to the
ICC regardless of the consent of the state involved. This was the case
regarding Sudan (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593),
and also regarding Libya (United Nations Security Council Resolution
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1970).50 If the Security Council makes such a resolution, then it will
neutralize the incentive to continue with the occupation in order to
prevent the occupying state from joining the Rome Statute. However,
the problem is that the Security Council is a political organ in which
five states possess veto power. It is enough that one of those states has
a political interest (of course, in the eyes of its leader) in preventing
the ICC from receiving jurisdiction; and also that this state gives its
own political interests preference over justice or any other
consideration in voting to reject this solution.
The second possibility is that the Security Council would
determine that the ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes that have been
committed in the specific territory before the end of occupation; and,
in specific cases, it might even decide to prevent the emerging state
from adopting the Rome Statute, even prospectively. A resolution like
this would be similar to the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1422 and 1487,51 in which it was determined that, in a case
involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, over acts or omissions
relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation of the
United Nations, the ICC shall not commence or proceed with
investigation or prosecution of any such case for a twelve-month
period, unless the Security Council decides otherwise; in order to base
its authority, the Security Council determined that operations
established or authorized by the United Nations Security Council are
deployed to maintain or restore international peace and security, and it
then acts according to Chapter 7. This means of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security may give the Security
Council authority to block the emerging free state from joining the
ICC, under a resolution formulated according to Chapter 7. However,
by adopting a resolution like this, first, we disregard the “friendly face”
of partial jurisdiction. The citizens of the new free state will not be
protected from war crimes by the ICC. Second, this would politicize
the ICC in the sense that strong states would be expected to be relieved
of international criminal responsibility. It would create double
standards and would impair the legitimacy of the ICC; the ICC would
be perceived as an agent of imperialism, and international law violators
50

S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1970, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
51
S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002); S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003).
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might disseminate nationalist feelings and take advantage of them in
order to represent themselves as innocent. Third, since it is very hard
to pass a resolution in the Security Council, this solution could
sometimes be only a theoretical possibility. Again, it would be enough
that only one of the five veto-holding states would be interested in the
rejection of this solution.
b.

Amending the Rome Statute to Abolish
Retroactive Adopting

One solution for the ICC’s jurisdiction problem would be to
amend the Rome Statute or to give it a narrow interpretation that would
exclude the possibility for an occupied party to accept the ICC’s
jurisdiction retroactively. However, the consequence would be the
abandonment of the benefits conferred by the ICC in its capacity as an
institution protecting the human rights of occupied people. Such an
amendment/interpretation might also present an incentive for one state
to occupy another state in order to act in its territory undeterred by the
Rome Statute. A state might also make a preemptive strike prior to the
other side joining the ICC. When both states might benefit from acting
first—by attacking the other or by joining the ICC—this might lead to
wars, even when each side would prefer to satisfy the other by not
going to war and by not joining the ICC. In addition, this solution
would not solve the problem if the occupying state maintained the
occupation in order to prevent the emerging free state from joining,
even prospectively. The price is very high, but on the other hand, the
significance of the alternative might be that the occupation would
continue and that the criminals would not be brought to justice. Thus,
we might, in certain situations, have no end to the occupation and no
protection under international criminal law.
c.

Amending the Rome Statute to Have StateConsent Jurisdiction

The Rome Statute could be amended with a provision that there should
be state consent in order to establish jurisdiction. This would prevent
the problems pointed out in this article. However, we would then
abandon the benefits conferred by the ICC in terms of human-rights
protection and would dramatically weaken the incentives for a state to
join the ICC. The ICC would not be a mechanism by which a state
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could promise jurisdiction over war crimes against its people that
might be committed on its territory. 52
A partial solution might be to recognize the jurisdiction already
held by the ICC but to make it impossible for additional states to join.
However, first, this would create a sense of double standards and
thereby delegitimize international law; and second, it would provide a
strong incentive for states to take measures to prevent new states from
joining until the time comes to freeze the legal situation. Thus, even if
it were far too costly to maintain an occupation indefinitely, in order
to prevent the occupied people from joining the Rome Statute, the
occupier might consider it worthwhile to continue the occupation until
“freezing day.” We presented and discussed this possible solution, but
we propose to reject this solution.
d.

Agreement as a Potential Solution

Another solution to the ICC’s jurisdiction problem might be a
peace treaty in which the occupied state would be obliged not to accept
the authority of the court over crimes that had been committed before
the withdrawal of the occupying forces and perhaps even obliged not
to accept the Rome Statute prospectively. However, this solution
presents at least four major disadvantages. First, we know that there
are some failures on our way to agreement, such as over-optimism,
asymmetric information, and a moral-hazard problem;53 agreement is
not always achieved, at least not immediately. Second, it involves
abandonment of the benefits conferred by the ICC as a mechanism for
protecting the human rights of the occupied people and as a mechanism
of encouraging the occupied people to ameliorate their resistance.
Third, one state might occupy another or even brutalize its occupation
in order to coerce the occupied people into undertaking not to join the
ICC. Fourth, it is only a partial solution since the occupying state may
52

Another advantage of the Rome Statute that we might abandon by reverting to a
state-consent regime is the existing possibility that by joining the Rome Statute, a
state may signal its peaceful intention and its trust. By joining the ICC Regime, a
state could lessen the prospect of war created when two states mistrust each other to
the extent that one of them might launch a preemptive strike.
53
Moral hazard is the problem that since the future behavior of a party is
unobservable, it will be impossible to verify if they perform the contract, what
incentivizes them to violate the contract, and what incentivizes the other side not to
enter into agreement with them. For example, there is a moral hazard problem
regarding the obligation of a party not to arm.
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fear that this article in the peace treaty will not be recognized as legal
by the Court.54
e.

Strengthening Alternative Mechanisms

Another solution might be to strengthen other mechanisms of
protection under humanitarian law, especially those based on universal
jurisdiction. If we decided to cancel the right to join the ICC
retroactively, those mechanisms would promote the goal of human
rights protection, which would become more essential in the absence
of the mechanism of the ICC. However, even if we decided to keep
the right to join the ICC retroactively, it would be important to
strengthen mechanisms to protect human rights, in order to reduce the
counter-productive incentive presented by the ICC. A particular
mechanism that might protect human rights and mitigate the problem
with the ICC might be to recognize universal jurisdictions of thirdparty states. If such third-party states enforced international law on
criminals who were citizens of states that were not parties to the Rome
Statute, our problem could be mitigated; the counterproductive
incentive would be weakened because joining the ICC by the emerging
state would now present less risk to the occupying power. Third-state
jurisdiction should serve as a complementary mechanism to the ICC;
it is not true that in light of the existence of the ICC, there is no need
in this mechanism. On the contrary, the need for it becomes stronger
as a means to reduce the incentive for the occupier to continue the
54

The ICC decided:
Arguments were also advanced during the hearing that certain agreements
entered into between the United States and Afghanistan affect the
jurisdiction of the Court and should be a factor in assessing the
authorisation of the investigation. The Appeals Chamber is of the view
that the effect of these agreements is not a matter for consideration in
relation to the authorisation of an investigation under the statutory
scheme. As highlighted by the Prosecutor and LRV 1, article 19 allows
States to raise challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court, while articles 97
and 98 include safeguards with respect to pre-existing treaty obligations
and other international obligations that may affect the execution of
requests under Part 9 of the Statute. Thus, these issues may be raised by
interested States should the circumstances require, but the arguments are
not pertinent to the issue of the authorisation of an investigation.

International Criminal Court, Judgment on the appeal against the Decision on the
authorization of an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17 OA4 (March 5, 2020), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.PDF.
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occupation and in order to reduce the incentive for states to refrain
from joining the ICC themselves. However, this solution presents
many problems: first, a third state might not have the capacity to
enforce its court decision or even to investigate or prosecute a war
criminal who lives in another state. Second, third parties sometimes
do not have the political will to bring war criminals from another
country to justice, especially when the war criminals are from strong
states. This means that this solution cannot address the problem of
occupation by strong states, which might violate humanitarian law.
The conclusion is that third-state jurisdiction might weaken the
negative incentives presented by the Rome Statute, but it cannot
eliminate them. Thus, this might be only a partial solution to the ICC
problem. In addition, this solution would create a perception of double
standards, and this third state would lose its legitimacy for intervening
in order to prevent war crimes in other states. However, we can also
point out the “friendly face” of this solution: it would improve the
situation. It is better for a state to enforce international law if, and only
if, it has the capability to do so than for it to completely avoid doing
so. This applies especially in cases in which the potential war criminal
cannot know beforehand whether they are going to be brought to
justice in this third state; in such cases, the possibility might deter those
potential war criminals. In addition, the punishments in those cases
should be enhanced in order to reinforce the deterrence. Furthermore,
this mechanism would be more effective in human rights protection if
it were adopted by a variety of states and if states agreed to extradite
war criminals. However, even if this solution were adopted, we would
still have the ICC problem; therefore, we wish to also suggest a
modification of this solution. On the one hand, the right to join the
ICC retroactively might be cancelled and, on the other hand, the thirdparty universal jurisdiction mechanism could be strengthened in
parallel. The result would be that we would eliminate the counterproductive incentive provided by the Rome Statute but would still
retain partial protection of human rights. However, this would not
eliminate the incentive for a state to continue its occupation in order to
prevent the emerging state from joining the ICC prospectively.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/11

26

Weiss: ICC & Occupation

2021

ICC & OCCUPATION
f.

823

Allowing the Occupied People to Adopt the
Rome Statute

Another solution to the ICC’s jurisdiction problem would be to
recognize the legal right of the occupied people to accept ICC’s
jurisdiction even before they achieve their independence; this
acceptance could be exercised by their representatives. For example,
the PLO was recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people
before the international community. 55 According to this suggested
solution, recognized representatives should also be authorized to adopt
the Rome Statute, even if the occupying people have no state. We
strongly recommend this solution.
The abovementioned proposed solution of allowing the
occupied people to adopt the Rome Statute offers several benefits.
First, if the occupied people became a party to the statute, this would
remove the incentive for the occupying state to maintain the
occupation in order to prevent the occupied people from joining the
ICC. Second, it could confer international legal protection on people
who need it; a main objective of international law is to protect people
under occupation. In addition, it would provide the occupying state
with an incentive to end the occupation since war crimes are almost an
inherent feature of occupation. Third, it would provide an incentive to
the occupied people to civilize their resistance and especially to avoid
terrorism. This is because from the moment they ratify the Rome
Statute, they would be exposed to the possibility of international
criminal processes, whereas if they followed a line of legal resistance,
then they could join the ICC without fearing to be brought to justice.
Thus, they will be incentivized to refrain from terrorism both because
of the deterrence of international law and in order to make it
practicable for them to join the ICC, now or in the future which could
in turn deter the occupier from committing war crimes. However, this
solution is not perfect. It could not work if the occupier appointed a
“puppet government” and, furthermore, would present the occupying
power with an incentive to nominate such a government. Second, it
also could not work if the occupied people, who are politically weak,
had no recognized representative, and a strong occupier might also
prevent such recognition. In fact, the occupier would be presented with
an incentive to block recognition of the representative of the occupied
people. Furthermore, the solution of conferring power to adopt the
55

See U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. Supp. No 21, Doc. A/RES/3236 (Nov. 22, 1974).
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Rome Statute on the representative of the occupied people would not
be satisfactory if the representative is a despot responsible for war
crimes or crimes against humanity. However, the future independent
state might accede to the Rome Statute since it would not object to its
despot being brought to justice. Thus, in this case, the occupying state
would still have a strong incentive to maintain the occupation.
Furthermore, the occupying state still would have an incentive to
provoke war crimes by the occupied people and also civil war among
them in order to discourage them from joining the ICC. The occupying
state could threaten and harass the occupied people, possibly
persuading them that joining the ICC would not be a rational step for
them.
Our proposal is to recognize the right of the occupied people to
join the ICC even before they become a state. The same logic leads to
other similar conclusions such that the international community should
recognize the right of the occupied people to establish their own state
even before the end of the occupation. The International Criminal
Court should recognize their declaration of independence even if they
do not have effective control. The particular moral from our discussion
is that the International Criminal Court should recognize the right of
Palestine to join the Rome Statute, at least prospectively, even before
the end of occupation. Otherwise, the court may incentivize Israel to
continue with the occupation.
g.

Recognition of Hypothetical Acceptance of
ICC Jurisdiction

Giving power to undemocratic representatives is sometimes
not enough. So, how can we overcome the problems inherent in the
solution that involves giving the authority to the representative? The
remedy for this agency problem might be to recognize a hypothetical
acceptance of the jurisdiction. When, for example, the ICC determines
that it is in the best interest of an occupied people to join the ICC, then
the ICC should become their hypothetical representative in accepting
its jurisdiction, especially when they have no realistic possibility to
accept it by themselves. It will dramatically weaken the incentive of
the occupier to appoint a “puppet government” in order to prevent the
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occupied people from joining. It would be a step toward a perfect
universal jurisdiction, which is, in my opinion, the optimal solution. 56
The last solution, i.e., of giving power to the representative of
the state to join, or recognizing its hypothetical consent, offers an
additional advantage: it solves the problem of an occupier who
maintains occupation in order to prevent the emerging free state from
joining the ICC, even prospectively. If there were mechanisms that
gave the occupied people a practical possibility to adopt the Rome
Statute before the end of occupation, then this counterproductive
incentive would be eliminated. However, it is not clear that this
solution would be acceptable by the international community, even if
adopted by the court. The parties who resist universal jurisdiction
would be expected to reject this as a step toward universal jurisdiction.
Is this proposed solution far enough from universal jurisdiction that it
could be accepted by the universal jurisdiction rejectionists? Does the
court itself have authority to interpret the Rome Statute in a way that
actually invites the universal jurisdiction to enter “via the window”
after its entry “via the door” was intentionally excluded by the
founding fathers of the Rome Statute? How much should it be
considered to be legitimate, and what should be the weight of such
considerations?
5.

THE GENERALITY OF THE PROBLEM57

This paper is written in the background of the Israeli-Palestine
conflict and the necessity that the international community avoid

56

We wish to make it clear that Rome Statute may be amended such that on the one
hand an occupied People will have the right to join the ICC, even before
independence and/or the ICC will have authority to recognize hypothetical
acceptance of its Jurisdiction, and, on the other hand, a state would no longer have
the power to join the ICC retroactively.
57
Recently, Shai Dothan referred to the draft of this paper in order to refute
Holtermann’s argument that the very existence of the ICC has only deterrence
benefits and no deterrence costs. Dothan gave additional examples, such that a
country may avoid from intervening in order to prevent war crimes in another
country, discouraged by the fear that their intervention will lead to war crimes by
them for which they will be investigated and prosecuted. It is actually equivalent to
the argument that if the policeperson may be accountable, then they will be
incentivized not to intervene. The argument of Dothan is stronger since a
policeperson who does not intervene may face sanctions, while a country that does
not intervene does not face sanctions, except the loss of prestige; and if a state is
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providing incentives to continue with the occupation instead of helping
to promoting peace. The International Criminal Court can be used as a
mechanism that promotes peace and prevents war crimes. This will be
the case if the International Criminal Court recognizes in its
jurisdiction regarding the Israeli-Palestine Conflict. However, if the
International Criminal court accepts the view that since Palestine is
under occupation, Palestine has no right to join, then the court will
incentivize Israel to continue with the occupation and it will lead to
more wars and war crimes. It will be a disaster for both sides.
Adam Smith was right when he pointed out that the end of
colonialism is in the best interest of the colonialist too.58 It is also in
the best interest of Israel to shift from occupation to peace, and it is
also in the best interest of Israel that the court does not decide that since
Palestine is not a state, Palestine has no right to join.
This paper presented a refutation to the view that partial universal
jurisdiction is always the second-best option to universal jurisdiction.
If partial jurisdiction is such that occupied people can join the court
only after the end of the occupation, then at least in cases such as the
motivated by imperial prestige, they may intervene in a wrong way. Another
example given by Dothan is the marginal deterrence effect of punishment:
if people expect to be punished by the ICC anyway, they may decide to
commit more crimes as they might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a
lamb. Moreover, additional crimes can actually reduce the chances of
being prosecuted by the ICC if they are targeted at silencing potential
witnesses.

Shai Dothan, The ICC is NOT a Slice of Cheese, (J. INT’L CRIM. JUST., Working
Paper No. 184, 2019). For the paper of Holtermann, see Jakob von Holderstein
Holtermann, A “Slice of Cheese”—a Deterrence-Based Argument for the
International Criminal Court, 11 HUM. RTS. REV. 289, 303-04 (2010).
58
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. 7 (1776). He explained the
economical mistake of the colonialists by this:
They did not consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and
nations, arisen chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen
from the very small quantities of them which nature has anywhere
deposited in one place, from the hard and intractable substances with
which she has almost everywhere surrounded those small quantities, and
consequently from the labour and expense which are everywhere
necessary in order to penetrate to and get at them. They flattered
themselves that veins of those metals might in many places be found as
large and as abundant as those which are commonly found of lead, or
copper, or tin, or iron. The dream of Sir Walter Raleigh concerning the
golden city and country of Eldorado, may satisfy us that even wise men
are not always exempt from such strange delusions.

Id.
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Israeli-Palestine conflict, the traditional model protects human rights
more than the model of the particular partial universal jurisdiction.
There is even a broader moral: it is a great mistake to design
international criminal law such that it will be in the best interest of
political leaders to continue with a conflict in order to avoid justice.
International criminal law is based on imposing individual
responsibility. Through this imposition, it personally incentivizes the
leader to avoid a criminal policy, but it may also incentivize the leader
to choose a policy that gives them de facto personal immunity. Thus,
it was a mistake not to give Ghadaffy the option to quit without being
brought to justice, and it was also a mistake regarding Assad. Let us
explain: In the 1970 resolution regarding Libya, the Security Council
made the mistake of the Rome Statute that this article has come to
expose. On February 26, 2011, the Security Council decided “to refer
the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since . . . February [15,]
2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.” 59 This
means that the Security Council gave the ICC retroactive jurisdiction,
which incentivized Gaddafi to preserve his power and provided him
with a commitment to continue fighting until achieving his goals rather
than incentivizing him to retire by prospective ultimatum. It was a
mistake of the Security Council not to give Gaddafi an option to quit
without paying for his former crimes.
The court may not be able to bring war criminals to justice yet
be able to prevent some states from granting asylum to war criminals.
The Arab Spring, and particularly the war in Syria, challenges the
institution of the International Criminal Court in this way: some
western states prevented the compromise that gives immunity to the
Syrian dictator Assad without having the power to bring him to justice
or to deprive him of power.
6.

CONCLUSION

A legal regime of partial universal jurisdiction might provide
an occupying state with an incentive to maintain occupation and,
sometimes, to spark civil war in the occupied territory and to promote
terrorist leadership among the occupied people. These actions might
59

In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan
Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters, UN Doc.
SC/10187/REV.1
(Feb.
26,
2011),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm.
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be carried out in order to prevent the emerging free state from joining
the ICC and accepting its jurisdiction over crimes and especially to
prevent it from joining retroactively. We have proposed and discuss
some possible solutions to this problem, especially the strengthening
of the third-party universal jurisdiction mechanism, the granting of
occupied peoples the right to join the ICC, and the authorization of the
ICC to recognize hypothetical acceptance of its jurisdiction. The
occupied people should have a legal right to join the ICC. Particularly,
we support the recognition of the right of Palestine to join the ICC.
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